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ETHICAL BASE OF J. HABERMAS' 
CRITICAL SOCIALTHEORY 
By Toshihiko HIRAI' 
J. Habermas identified his academic posItIon as the critical social theory (die 
kritische Gesellschaftstheorie) in his recent masterpiece, "The Theory of Communica-
tive Action, 1981" (Die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 1981) and presented 
its theoretical task in the conclusion of final consideration of the book. I) This book 
can be regarded as evidence why his theory is the critical theory of society. Such 
position may be characterized as succession to the consciousness of issues of the critical 
theory (Kritische Theorie) by early Horkheimer and Adorno on the one hand, and it 
may be a declaration of theoretical independence from the first generation of Frankfurt 
school represented by them, especially the late "Dialectic of Enlightenment." 
Habermas produced many works since his early major writing, "Structural Change 
of Publicity -Research of a Category of Civil Society, 1962" (Strukturwandel der 
Offenlichkeit, - Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der burgerlichen Gesellschaft, 
1962.) The translations of his major works have been published also in Japan. The 
scope of subjects which his works treat, covers many academic fields such as philosophy, 
sociology, politics, jurisprudence, economics, anthropology and linguistics. Needless 
to say, I cannot discuss about individual fields of his speciality, especially linguistics 
and, of course, won't provide comprehensive appreciation for his works in this paper, 
nor have intention to trace development of his thought as found in recent studies. On 
oil Professor, Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University. 
1) Jiirgen Habermas, Die Theoru des kommunikativen Handelns, Ffm. 1981. 
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the occasion of having translated a part of the above~mentioned book into Japanese, I 
would like to show straight forward what sense of methodology the critical social theory 
has arisen under the support of, and what base of thought it is supported by, and what 
construction the system of his theory has after all. 
I Third Reflection of Reason 
In summer, 1981 when "The theory of Communicative ActionH was published, 
A. Honneth, E. Knadler=Bunte and A. Widman had a talk with Habermas under the 
theme of "Dialectic of rationalization" (Dialektik def Rationalisierung). In this talk, 
Habermas mentioned four motives for writing the abovementioned book. Among 
these motives, it is the third motive, "Dialectic of social rationalization" (Dialektik cler 
gesellschaftlichen Rationalisierung), that plainly shows his sense of the issues. 
"This motive was already a major theme of the dialectic of enlightenment (Dialektik 
der AufkHirung)". Said Habermas, "What I wanted to express here is that the theory 
of modern ages-a theory to give the choices necessary for analyzing sociopathological 
phenomena or something grasped as materializing within the Marxist tradition-can 
be developed only in the concept of communication theory". Maintaining that this 
very communication concept is a related conc~pt to mediate between the theory of society 
and the theory of action, in addition, he said, "I showed development of a concept of 
society to connect between the theory of system and the theory of action-may be this 
is the fourth motive-for this purpose. Since the theory of society developed in the 
category of totality is resolved into various elements of the theory, that is, the theory of 
action on the one hand and the theory of system on the other hand, a task of the modern 
theory of society is now-to integrate these two paradigms. Since the criticism of in-
strumental reason (Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft) can no more be continued with 
the old critical theory, more suitable form of criticism of functionalistic reason can be 
shown as stated above. "2) 
Today it is well known that Adorno charged, in "Dialectic of Enlightenment" 
written by him jointly with Horkheimer, that the reason of enlightenment generating 
modern ages had been rather reversed to mythology and transformed into irrationalism. 
Although it was true that "programs of enlightenment were to liberate the world from 
spells and intention of enlightenment was to dissolve mythology and to degenerate 
authority of phantasy by knowledge'?> the reason of enlightenment has generated 
materiality and believed in quantitative countability of things, and it has oppositely 
made such features penetrate into the human world. This is the logic of reification by 
Adorno. I once pointed out in my paper "Lukacs and Adorno-concerning Modern 
Dialectic" (1978) that Adorno succeeded to the reification theory by Lukacs.') 
"Numbers became the standard of enlightenment. The same formula rules both 
2) J. Habennas, Die neu.e Unflbersichtlichkeit, Ffm. 1985, p. 180. 
S) M. Horkheimer u. T.W. Adorno, Dialektik de,. Au.jkliirung, Philosophische Fragmente, Ffm. 1969, p. 8. 
4) Method and History oj Social Sciences, Minerva Shabo, 1978. p. 184-202. 
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civilian justice and commodity exchange.-The civill society is ruled by the equivalent 
exchange principle. The civil society makes elements unreducible to a common 
denominator be comparable by ndllcing them to some abstract quantity. From the 
viewpoint of enlightenment, what has not resolved in a number or unity in the end 
would be regarded as semblance" ,5) 
It is Habermas that positioned such paradox of enlightenment by Adorno along 
development of dialectic of the critical reason and determined his own situation against 
Adorno. Habermas considered in his paper, "Duality of Mythology and Enlighten-
ment", that a focus of the critical theory was the critical character and reflectional char-
acter held by the reason of enlightenment. In this sense, it can be said that Habermas 
obviously returned to the critical philosophy of Kant and the reflectivity in Hegel's 
dialectic. Of course, Habermas himself rejected classical Philosophy, especially the 
transcendental philosophy of Kant and the teleological philosophy of consciousness of 
Hegel as metaphysics. Therefore, he decisively rejected the teleological theory of class 
consciousness of the Hegel style resting with the base of Lukacs "History and Class 
Consciousness". However, Habermas found in his discussion the relation between 
human autonomy (dignity of individuals) and social solidality of individuals, and 
obviously relied on the modern ethical and historical view of the German classical 
philosophy when he maintained that this process is simultaneously self-reflection and 
learning process. For Habermas, therefore, dialectic is dynamism of self-denial and 
self-realization. Of course, the subject of Habermas is neither the world spirit of Hegel 
nor laboring proletariat of Marx. However, he is quite irrelative to the thought of 
preestablished harmony tinged by eighteen-century-like optimism. 
Following Durkheim, Habermas also maintained that there are two sides of human 
character, that is, an element of social solidality that human beings want to belong to 
group and another element of differentiation which will segregate individuality from 
groups. Transformation of mythology into enlightenment is just a step where an 
individual intends to be independent and builds himself or, so to speak, the first step 
of self-reflection of human reason. That is segregation of human beings from nature 
and the step of reification of objects or liveration from magic. Essentially, there should 
have happened to occur historical evolution caused by rationalization. However, 
doesn't such materialization be just transformed into teleologically rational technocracy, 
as far as the enlightenment led by satisfaction of self-desire is confronted with control 
of the nature? Adorno and Horkheimer made negative self-reflection against such 
reason of enlightenment as follows: "While the process of enlightenment arises by the 
motive of self-preservation from the very onset, this motive of self-preservation itself 
causes damage to the reason, because this motive intends to employ the reason only in 
the form of teleologically rational control of the nature and impulsive control by instinct 
as the instrumental reason".6) They also made this instrumental reason penetrate not 
5) M. Horkheimer u. T.W. Adorno, ibid., p. 13-4. 
6) J. Habermas, De,. philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, Ffm. 1985, p. 135. 
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only into science but also moral and art and maintained that various moments of reason 
found in respective field, had retrograded into rationality which serves self-preservation 
becoming wild. 
Seeing like this, Adorno's criticism against the instrumental reason should overlap 
the way from Hegel to Nietzsche. Habermas calls this criticism on enlightenment the 
second self-reflection of reason which follows the first step of criticism on mythology by 
reason. Of course, they did not extract "the will toward power" from criticism on the 
modern reason, as Nietzsche did. Saying in the style of Habermas, the critical reason 
maintained by them is nothing but reason which is captured by the social system and 
has lost its critical character. Had the critical reason really retrognaded wholly into 
the instrumental reason under the social system as Adorno and his followers maintained? 
As far as it is a critical theory, the reason has a task to make self-reflection again 
on such degenerated reason. In this regard, Habermas clearly returns, through 
the rationalization theory of Max Weber, to the standpoint of the critical philosophy 
of Kant rather than Nietzsche. In other words, enlightenment has never dissolved 
completely by mythology. Saying like this, we should read his methodological con-
sciousness as the "phenomenology of mind" in which young Hegel once approved the 
historical inevitability of enlightenment with opposition to irrationalism of Schelling 
and Jacobi and struggled to incorporate the inevitability into his own system. If so, 
the base of Habermas' thought is not only on Weber's theory as generally said but 
also on Kant's critical philosophy and Hegel's social philosophy beyond Weber. Of 
course, there may be some differences in character between Kant and ,Hegel, but it 
can be considered that Habermas has been attracted by the modern rationalism which 
German classical philosophy universally have. 
n Regeneration of Modern Age 
-Possibility to Criticize VaIidity Claims-
While enlightenment has surely raised productive power for self-preservation of 
mankind through the process of rationally overcoming nature for Adorno, it has instead 
paralyzed abili'ty of reconciliation with nature beyond mere self-preservation. If so, 
has the critical reason ever found perished? This step is clearly nothing but a process 
to transform rationality into materiality. Habermas protested against the reason 
transformed into the instrumental reason and added, so the speak, the "third self-
reflection" to the critical reason. The way to restore critical character of the reason 
for Habermas is basically to regenerate potentiality of such reason through argument 
and it is nothing but process for human beings to intend to understand mutually through 
discussion. Only by this discussion, citizens can acquire power opposable to authority 
of the social system by concentrating their own volition. To tell the truth, Habermas 
entrusted the principle of modern democracy resisting totalitarianism to communicative 
action. Originally, the modern enlightenment should have held criticism of such reason. 
Through this process, human beings can become autonomous as modern individuals 
ETHICAL BASE OF J. HABERMAS' CRITICAL SOCIALTHEORY 5 
and also be incorporated as socially independent personality. 
Isn't Adorno's failure to regenerate reason in his writing "Dialectic of Enlighten-
ment" caused by the fact that he has unified various functions of reason into the cogni-
tive and instrumental reason? Against this fact, Habermas introduced, in his above-
mentioned writing, "differentiation of value fields" in the modern society after Max 
Weber. Although it is a little longer, I will here under mention the quotation as follows: 
"The original dignity of cultural models rests in what Max Weber called 'the highly 
autonomous differentiation in the sphere of value' (die eigensinnige Ausdifferenzierung 
cler Wertsphiihren). Far from being paralyzed, power to negate or competence to 
distinguish between "yes" and '~no" becomes raised along with the above. This is 
because it became possible to deal with matters relating to truth, justice and taste ac-
cording to their own original logic and to develop them. Surely, it can be said that 
tendency to drag all issues relating to validity into a narrow horizon of teleological ra-
tionality that was held by subjects devoting oneself to self.preservation or social systems 
only intending continuance of existence becomes deepen through capitalist economy 
and modern countries. However, it is coercive power to advance differentiation of 
reason that is opposed to and competing with such tendency of just social degradation 
of reason. Such coercive power has been induced by rationalization of the view of 
world and the life world, and therefor it should not be despised. Thus, the reason has 
taken a procedural character in this process. Requirement of validity is naturalistically 
assimilated to requirement of power and disintegration of critical ability is progressing on 
the one hand, and culture of various specialists has been formulated in competing with 
the above on the other hand. In this culture of specialists, three kinds of validity 
expressed in respective constituents give proper intention of autonomy to various 
demands for propositional truth, normative rightness and confirmatory character for 
beauty."7) 
Returning to Kant's critical philosophy also in this paper, Habermas divides the 
sphere of human action and assertion into theory, practice and judgment. This may 
be a variation of method which Lukacs elucidated antinomy of classic philosophy in 
chapter 2 of "Reification and Consciousness of Proletarist." Such division of human 
workings into three sphere is the products of modern ages and "rationality" should 
be pursued in respective sphere. Thus, Habermas has thoroughly extended the 
concept of rationality not only to the teleological rationality, but also to sphere of moral 
and art. This very dissolution is a feature of modernization. In this case, the three 
sphere can be never ranked by the value standard and they are equally elements con-
stituting modern civil society. Such differentiation is objective. Habermas formerly 
clarified differentiation and mutual relation among each sphere of economy, politics 
and culture in "Problems of Legitimacy in Late Capitalism" (1973). Since problems 
of the social system in the organized modern capitalism themselves are major points to 
be considered, I'd like to deal with them on another occasion. Already in this stage, 
7) J. Habermas, ibid., p. 137. 
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Habermas discriminated requirement of validity of respective action and speech in 
sphere of economy, politics, etc. and named the former for propositional truth and the 
latter for legitimacy of norm.S) 
Habermas maintained as follows in his paper "Some Characteristics of the Mythical 
and the Modern Ways of Understanding the World." "In mythical thought, various 
validity claims such as propositional truth, normative rightness and expressive sincerity 
are not yet completely divided. But even the diffuse concept of validity in general is 
still not freed from empirical admixtures. Concepts of validity such as morality and 
truth are amalgamated with empirical ordering concepts, such as causality and health. 
Thus a linguistically constituted worldview can not identified with the worldorder 
itself to such an extent that it can not be perceived as an interpretation of the world 
that is subject to error and open to criticism. In this respect the confusion of nature 
and culture takes on the significance of a reification ofworldview."9) 
In this cas~, "various validity claims", for example, relate to rationality to take 
appropriate measures according to purposes or effectiveness of propositional truth or 
teleological action as for science and technology or teleologically rational works, and 
mean validity of "action to be regulated normally" which acts according to existing 
norm within the sphere of moral or law as for normative rightness, and further imply 
rationality of the sincerity how to express own experiences within the sphere of art, 
literature or drama as for sincerity in self-presentation. Upon recognizing that every 
human action as it should be in these respective life spheres differs, Habermas considered 
that there is human relation where every such action requires recognition or agreement 
by others with declaration of respective validity claim. This is his "life world" and 
social integration against the social system. The core concept of the above is not the 
passive reason from the external by the social system but "communicative practice" to 
intend understanding based on criticizable validity claims. 
"To sum up, we can say that actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presen-
tation, and also evaluative expression, supplement constative speech acts in constituting 
a communicative practice which, against the background of a lifeworld, is oriented to 
achieving, sustaining, and renewing consensus~and indeed a consensus that rests on 
the intersubjective recognition of criticizable validity claims. The rationality inherent 
in this practice is seen in the fact a communicatively achieved agreement must be based 
in the end on reasons. And the rationality of those who participate in this communica-
tive practice is determined by whether, if necessary, they could, under suitable circum-
stances, provide reasons for their expressions. Thus the rationality proper to the com-
municative practice of everyday life points to the practice of argumentation as a court 
of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative action with other means 
when disagreements can no longer be repaired with everyday routines and yet are not 
to be settled by the direct or strategic use of force. For this reason I believe that the 
8) J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spiitkapitalismus, Ffm. 1973, p. 21. 
9) J. Habermas, The Theory o/Communicative Action, traslated by Th. McCarthy, Boston, 1983, p. 50. 
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concept of communicative rationality, which refers to an clarified systematic inter~ 
connection of universal validity claims, can be adequately explicated only in terms of 
a theory of argumentation. "10) 
Habermas stated that this argumentation is "that type of speech in which par-
ticipants the matize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them 
through arguments." Although he develops concrete contents of this manner of 
dialogue, I have no room to examine linguistic meaning of his work. However, I will 
clarify that this demand of validity is criticizable as far as it is a rational speech and that 
argument is connected with the learning process. He maintained as follows: "We 
can correct failed attempts if we can successfully identify our mistakes. The concept of 
grounding is interwoven with that of learning. Augumentation plays an important 
role in learning processes as well. "11) If these comments are appropriate, there should 
be theoretical discussion to consider propositional truth, moral and practical discussion 
to examine legitimacy for norm and aesthetic discussion in respective spheres, and it is 
possible to "creatively regenerate negative experiences" through refle,::ctional media of 
discussion. 
By the way, what is very characteristic of Habermas is to connect such validity or 
differentiation of value spheres (differentiation of modern ages) with learning process 
and to find this process in the theory of individual formation by Piaget and to grasp it 
as internal evolution from child to adults. Connecting with development of worldview, 
this evolution leads to the theory of social evolution. In this sense, it can be considered 
that his theory is clearly based on the conscious development of mind with mediation of 
the negative experience in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Mind" with modification of 
conscious subjects. This is the reason why he asserts the universality of Western 
rationalism. Quoting Piaget, Habermas maintained as follows: 
"The growing child works out for himself, equiprimordially, the concept of the 
external and internal worlds in dealing practically with objects and with himself. Piaget 
also draws a distinction between dealing with physical objects and dealing with social 
objects, that is, reciprocal action between a subject and objects and reciprocal action 
between a subject and other subjects. Correspondingly the external universe is differ-
entiated into the world of perceptible and manipulable objects on the one hand and the 
world of normatively regulated interpersonal relations on the other. The learning 
mechanisms of assimilation and accommodation operate through both of these types of 
action in a specific way."12) Therefore, Habermas' regeneration of reason of enlighten-
ment is clearly connected with the theory of social evolution of mankind as historical 
consciousness of enlightenment. 
10) J. Habennas, ibid., pp. 17-8. 
11) J. Habennas, ibid., p. 18. 
12} J. Habennas, ibid., pp. 68-9. 
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m Concept of ComlDuuicative Action 
I have proved in the preceding chapter that Habermas captured critical reason in 
relation with the validity claims in the three spheres of propositional truth, rightness 
regulated by norm and self-presentational sincerity. In this case, respective validity 
has rationality because it can be grounded and criticized. This is a special feature of 
modern ages and the base to form the modern society. As Habermas has assumed, it 
is in the differentiated world that speaking and acting subjects assert respective validity 
claim. Thus, the world is divided into three kinds of world, that is, objective world, 
social world and subjective world. In the sphere of science and technology, for example, 
subjects who cognize objects involving the natural world, maintain how true the proposi-
tion is and how adaptable and effective means to be taken for certain purpose are. In 
the sphere of moral or law, the world corresponding to subjects would not be the objective 
world but be the social world in the meaning that subjects act according to norm recog-
nized as social order also by others and ask its validity. Between these two categories, 
there is a distinct difference. This is also appropriate to the sphere of art or literature. 
The actor's assertion of validity of sincerity to express himself asks how frankly his 
performance or works express his experiences. In the aesthetic sphere, it can be said 
that subjects correspond to the subjective world. 
At any rate, Habermas analyzed what world the action in respective spheres relates 
to with mediation of three kinds of validity claim. In the first place, the demanded 
validity of propositional truth is communication to be attained also in the social system 
but not communicative action, even if it is grounded by a speaker and is criticizable 
from a receiver. These two categories are clearly discriminated and show division of 
communication concept between the social system and the life world. In case of 
teleologically rational action, an isolated individual confronts an object. There may 
be some cases where at least two subjects simultaneously make teleological action, 
affecting accounts or determination by others. Habermas called it "strategic action" 
and, in any case, it is action to measure truth or effectivenes on his own interest. 
"The teleological model of action takes language as one of several media through 
which speakers oriented to their own success can influence one another in order to bring 
opponents to form or to grasp beliefs and intentions that are in the speaker'own 
interest. "13) If so, this reason is nothing but the above-mentioned instrumental reason 
for self-preservation, however rational it may be: 
In the sphere of moral or law and the sphere of art, the model of such instrumental 
reason is not always available. Even in these cases, "Each of actors pursues a certain 
purpose by mutually understanding and regulating own action. In such extent, 
teleological constitution is basic for every concept of action". However, the action reg-
ulated by norm, which is different from teleologically rational action, is interaction relat-
ing to not only existing objective world but also social world. "There is the social world 
to which the actor belongs as a role-playing subject, as do additional actors who can take 
13) J. Habermas, ibid., p. 95. 
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up normatively regulated interactions among themselves. A social world 'consists of a 
normative context that lays down which interactions belong to the totality of legitimate 
interpersonal relations. "101> In case of dramaturgical, besides, the relation of mutual 
agreement is produced between the public and performer. Therefore, such action is 
not "strategic action model" to intend direct effects but "social action to connect actor's 
own action with other's action. 
Seeing like this, Habermas seems to discriminate the teleologically rational action 
or strategic action from the norm-regulated action or dramaturgical action. Of course, 
such strategic action relates to not only teleologically rational action but also other 
two kinds of action. Since the former surely has cognitive and instrumental rationality 
and connects with concept to be a base of the system theory, Habermas requiring regen~ 
eration of the critical reason will give negative appreciation to the teleological action. 
As stated above, roles played by the cognitive and instrumental reason for negating 
reification (magic performing) of the mythological world view and establishing the 
modern world view, should not be disregarded. As Adorno described, however, pene~ 
tration of this reason throughout" the whole social life will again lead to new reification. 
Therefore, "Dialectic fo Enlightenment" charged that this modern reason has been 
transformed into the instrumental reason and reversed to mythology. Habermas 
contrastingly intended to regenerate, among reason of enlightenment, new critical 
reason enabling mutual criticism between personality and another personality. This 
is the validity claim in the life world and the reason to guide formation of agreement 
through discussion on the claim. It is for that purpose that we propose "theory of 
argumentation" in the opening chapter. 
Indeed, in this meaning, the normatively regulated action and the dramaturgical 
action are social actions in which we can interact. But, in Chapter 3, Habermas 
characterizes three concepts of actions in relation with respective world and judges 
them as incomplete under linguistic action, and then proposes the communicative action 
as the 4th model of action. This communicative action model is the key concept to 
criticize communication of the social system by the life world and I think that Chapter 
3 introducing this concept is important for his social theory. Habermas maintained 
that each of the linguistic concept in existing three action models is one~sided and 
criticized as follows: "The one~sideness of the first three concepts of language can he 
seen in the fact that the corresponding types of communication singled out by them 
prove to be limit cases of communicative action: first, the indirect communication of 
those who have only the realization of their own ends in view; second, the consensual 
action of those who simply actualize an already existing normative agreement; and 
third, presentation of self in relation to an audience."15) If so, is the interaction an 
agreement only to testify rightness of own according to existing norm even in case of 
norm~regulated action? Isn't it an agreement for forming political will which is captur-
14) J. Habermas, ibid., p. 88. 
15) J. Haberrnas, ibid., p. 95. 
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ed by existing order? Critical examination must extend to the rightness of existing 
norm itself. 
Thus, Habermas called the field to integrate three kinds of formal world concepts, 
that is, the action model where persons participating in the interaction can reach under-
standing through free and critical discussion, for the "communicative action model." 
He explained this reflectional world-relation as follows: "Speakers integrate the 
three formal world-concepts, which appear in the other models of action either singly 
or in pairs, into a system and presuppose this system in common as a framework of 
interpretation within which they can reach an understanding. They no longer relate 
straightaway to something in the objective, social, or subjective worlds, instead they 
relativize their utterances against the possibility that their validity will be contested by 
other actors. Reaching an understanding functions as a mechanism for coordinating 
actions only through the participants in interaction to an agreement concerning the 
claimed validity of their utterances, that is, through intersubjectively recognizing the 
validity claims they reciprocally raise. IS) 
If so, it can be said that this concept of communicative action is not the fourth 
concept in parallel with other three spheres but the reflectional concept of action to 
criticize these three kinds of action concepts, that they fail into one-sidedness and 
fixedness and are going to be eroded by the social system. In addition, this reflectional 
concept of action characterizes the modernization theory of Habermas. In other 
words, modernization is to differentiate thoroughly life spheres on the one hand and 
produces bases to integrate them on other hand. This just means dialectic of differen-
tiation and integration. The action theory of Habermas is completely based on the 
concrete spheres of the modern social life in that sense and plays the role of drawing out 
critical latent power in these three kinds of action. He said, "With the model of com-
municative action we are supposing that participants in interaction can now mobilize 
the rationality potential-which according to our previous analysis resides in the actor' 
three relations to the world-expressly for the cooperatively pursued goal of reaching 
understanding.HI7) By the way, only that such reflectional functions criticize three kinds 
of world concepts positioned within one social system with understanding, comes to grasp 
communicative action too abstractly. Habermas explained the basic concept of this 
action in the life world, and described that human beings will, without any external 
compelling force, mutually declare respective validity claim, mutually criticize without 
authority nor privileged status, approve mutually and subjectively and reach under-
standing. In this case, he pursued this in the "theory of argumentation" -and conceived 
this to be mutual understanding through argument and discussion. What on earth 
does he grru;p this field of discussion? 
While actors will directly participate in discussion when they make interaction, 
Haberma~ described, "With a formal world-concept an actor becomes involved in 
16} J. Habermas, ibid., pp. 96-99. 
17) J. Habermas, ibid., p. 99. 
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suppositions of commonality that, from his perspective, point beyond the circle of those 
immediately involved and claim to be valid for outside interpreters as well.,,18) It is 
important that, so to speak, the third persons to observe and interprete are introduced, 
or that social scientists play roles in communicative action because observers can 
descriptively confirm "Whether an action accords with a given norm and whether or not 
the norm in turn enjoys social currency. "19) If SO, it should be expected to discuss 
deeper than the level to criticize whether actors of interaction conform to a certain 
norm. Further, this role of interpreters applies to the dramaturgical action. Hahermas 
said, "An interpreter can interpret an action rationally in such a way that he thereby 
captures elements of deception or self-deception. He can expose the latently strategic 
character of a self-presentation by comparing the manifest content of the utterance, 
that is, what the 'actor says, with what the actor means. "20) Even in this case, criticism 
should become possible on the level deeper than superficial relation between actors and 
public. 
In this case, Habermas calls such third parties observers, interpreters, or social 
scientists as case may be. This may be caused by the fact that he is developing his own 
view in various spheres of social theory such as science theory, social phenomenology 
and ethnomethodology. We can collectively call these persons for social scientists who 
refiectionally observe and interpret this interaction as a category different from persons 
who directly participate in interaction. Habermas' concept of communicative action 
can be said to be concept that these two parties cooperate in forming agreement. 
Certainly, roles of direct participants in communicative action and those of interpreters 
of the action are quite different. Habermas maintained, "We have to distinguish the 
interpretive accomplishments of an observer who wants to understand the meaning of 
a symbolic expression from those of participants in interaction who coordinate their 
actions through the mechanism of reaching understanding. Unlike those immediately 
involved, the interpreter is not striving for a interpretation on which there can be a 
consensus in order to harmonize his own action plans which those of other actors. "21) 
According to the communicative action model, internal constructions of mutual under-
standing of actors appears in the status of interpreters as non~participants. 
In this model, however, these two parties with different functions cooperate each 
other. This has become possible because, so to speak, mutual conversion of status 
among two parties is made. In other words, two parties are united in to one in the 
points that they "reach mutual agreement and in this agreement decides yes or no with 
suitable grounds" and clarifies the rational internal construction of action to intend to 
understand. Thus, it can be said that the actor becomes the interpreter, and vice versa. 
In this case, it is the attitude of an interpreter as a social scientist In the communica-
tive action and also issue of roles to be played by him that Habermas lays stress on. 
18) J. Habermas, ibid., p. 102. 
19) J. Habermas, ibid., p. 104. 
20) J. Habenna" ;b;d., p. 105. 
21) J. Habermas, ibid., p. 106. 
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Although the manner of his demonstration of communications on this issue is so round 
about that scope of his own view is very difficult to specify, social scientists also basically 
are not onlookers of interaction and they are requested to take the performative attitude. 
Habermas said, "The interpreter himself takes a position on the claim with which pur-
posive~rational actions appear; he relinguishes the attitude of a third person for the per-
formative attitude of a participant who is examining a problematic validity claim and, 
if need be, criticizing it. Rational interpretations are undertaken in a performative 
attitude, since the interpreter presupposes a basis for judgement that is shared by all 
parties, including the actors. "22) Interpreters become beyond the status of mere in· 
terpreters after they have become direct participant, shown critical attitude against 
validity claim and accepted it or not. Habermas calls subjects of such interpretation 
for "virtual participants" discriminated from direct participants. 
When interpreters participate in communicative action on the performative stand-
point as mentioned above, all acting subjects with speech and action ability should take 
both reflectional and critical attitude. This is because it is possible, as stated already, to 
clear up the relation of three kinds of world within the framework of one system (system 
of communicative action) while discriminating three kinds of validity at first. Habermas 
names this system the common definition of common situation for interaction.23) If 
agreement on such definition of common situation is obtained, the validity claim in 
three kinds of world could reflectionally be related. This can raise specific understanding 
in respective spheres to universal understanding. Habermas said as follows in relation 
with learning process: "The most general structures of communication that speaking 
and acting subjects have learned to master not only open up access to specific contexts. 
These same structures also simultaneously provide the critical means to penetrate 
a given context, to burst it open from within and to transcend it: the means, if need be, 
to push beyond a de facto established consensus, to revise errors, correct misunder· 
standings, and the like. The same structures that make it possible to reach an under· 
standing also provide for the possibility of reflection self-controle of this process. It 
is this potential for critique built into communicative action itself that the social scientist, 
by entering into the contexts of everyday action as a virtual participant, can systema-
tically exploit and bring into play outside these contexts and against their par-
ticularity. "24) 
IV Form.ation of Consensus and Discussion Ethics 
Habermas intended to establish a communicative action model and to connect the 
social system theory and the action theory. In the social system, the interaction of 
human beings is distorted by power or money and discussion without coercion is not 
formed. Certainly, modern ages have accelerated differentiation of living spheres and 
22) J. Habe"""" ibid., p. 103. 
23) J. Habermas, ibid., p. 117. 
24) J. Habermas. ibid., p. 120-1. 
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liberated human beings from magic of myth. This is obvious progress of modern ages. 
In this regard, it can be said that Habermas is obviously a son of modern enlightenment 
and a successor of Weber's historical view. If, however, reason is only incorporated into 
the economic system or the political system in the organized capitalist society, has 
reason again degenerated into instrumental reason? Here, Habermas presented the 
concept of "communicative action" where true agreement would be formed against 
communications in the social system. This very concept is that to be a standard of the 
life world. 
Habermas discriminated the life world from the social system and, at the same time, 
intended to mediate them with the communicative action concept. More concretely 
saying, speeching and acting subjects action in each living sphere realizing modernization 
or differentiation, presented each other validity claim proper to respective spheres and 
can reach agreement through mutual criticism by discussion. In this case, human 
beings to attend interaction are not restricted to direct participant in each sphere and 
social scientists considering objectively can also participate in the joint understanding 
process. In this joint work, rational discussion becomes possible for the first time, 
because -failure of teleological rationality or self-deceit of strategic action arising from 
the social system can be charged. What enables this joint work is the level of life world 
and a crisis of organized capitalism is nothing but penetration of the logic of social 
system into the life world. 'What resists this instrumental and functionalistic reason is 
nothing but formation of consensus through free discussion in the spontaneous society, 
isn't it? It may be said that Habermas ventured the principle of modern democracy 
on formation of such consensus. If so, he should simultaneously overcome horizon 
of the transcendental theory of life world such as Husserl's theory. 
By formation of consensus through free discussion in the spontaneous society, 
"The Essentials of Democracy" (1929) by A.D. Lindsay may be recollected. Lindsay 
defined democracy as follows in Chapter 3 of the book, " 'Discussion' and 'Senses of 
Meeting' as Common Thinking." "Democracy is based on the assumption that men 
can agree on common action which yet leaves each to live his own life-that if we really 
respect one another's personality we can find a common framework or system of rights 
within which the free moral life of the individual is possible. "-25) At such time, dis-
cussion meetings by Protestants in the Puritan Revolution period were the model for 
Lindsay and there appeared thought of Milton and besides Locke. Of course, Habermas 
and Lindsay were different on the background of thought. If, however, Habermas 
maintained meaning of discussion as common thinking when free moral life of in-
dividuals were referred to, there would be something related to Lindsay's thought. 
What exists on the base of theory of communicative action by Habermas is combi-
nation between such ethical view and democratic theory. Through the mediation of 
formal pragmatics, he proposed "discussion ethics" in the recent lecture, "Moral and 
Ethic" (1985) and intended to mediate between Kant's ethics of justice (autonomy 
25) A.D. Lindsay, The Essentials of Democracy, 2nd. ed., London. 1951. p. 33. 
14 T. HIRAI 
and dignity of individuals) and ethics of duty (solidarity) by Karl-Otto Apel's 
ideal communicative community. Only in the discussion, internal relation was an-
nounced where an individual is united with others while being autonomous and he can 
be united with universal mankind while being a member of a specific community. If 
so, this discussion ethics can be said to relate Kant's ethics with Hegel's social philosophy. 
At the beginning of this paper, it is in such meaning that I mentioned that the base of 
Habermas' critical social theory is German classic philosophy. It should become clear 
at the same time that this also connected with the concept of citizen's publicity or public 
opinion proposed in Habermas' early paper, "Structural Conversion of Publicity." 
Habermas did not restrict the concept of rationality to mere formal teleological 
rationality but extended it to every sphere of modern social life, and adopted as an 
object of discussion validity claim in respective spheres. If so, the concept of rationality 
was divided into two subclasses, that is, teleological rationality adapting to the social sys-
tem or rationality of egocentric strategic action and communicative rationality. In 
this case, there still remains a problem whether mere rationality can fully explain 
especially the dramaturgical action and another question how they should do when 
disagreement or collision occurs, may arise. However, it is assumed that disagreement 
may occur where there is distortion in interaction or something irrational operated and 
it should soon be overcome by discussion as far as rational subjects are concerned. 
Therefore, irrationality or disagreement may be opportunity of self-reflection and con-
dition of learning for subjects of interaction. If so, it may be said that the is clearly 
tinged with historical view of enlightenment, though it is not based on perfect optimism 
or predetermined harmony. 
Seeing like this, a view stated by J.F. Lyotard that the very mutual differentiation 
through sensitivity is a spring of creation,26) has not been formed from its onset, because 
this means retrogression to the second stage of negative self-reflection of the reason. If 
rationality vs. irrationality or reason vs. sensitivity is reduced to either element, the 
dynamism which is held by Hegel's dialectic hasn't been lost? 
26) J. Fran~ois Lyotard, La Condition postmoderne, 1979. 
